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Steve and Joe are both federal employees who have national security clearance.
One day, the agenciesfor which they work revoke their security clearances and subsequently terminate them. Steve, who is gay, believes thefederalgovernment has discriminated againsthim on the basis of his sexual orientation. However, Steve cannot bring
a Title VII claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964' because that statute does not
include gays and lesbians within its sphere of protectionfrom discrimination. Consequently, Steve brings an equalprotection claim directly under the Constitution, and the
1

42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1994).
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court performs a substantive review of the security clearance decision. Joe, who is an
Aftican American, believes the federal government has discriminated againsthim on

the basis of his race. Joe is able to bringa claim of discriminationunder Title V, but
the court rules that it does not have subject matterjurisdiction to review the merits of the
agency's decision to revoke his security clearance. Undaunted,Joe also brings a constitutional equal protection claim, but the court holds that Joe's Title VII claim precludes
the constitutionalclaim, because Congress created Title VU!to provide the solejudicial
remedy for a protected class member's claim of discrimination in federal employment.
Thus, a court will conduct a review of the merits of Steve's claim, but will refuse to
substantively review Joe's claim.
INTRODUCTION

Such disparate treatment raises a red flag whenever it occurs, but
becomes even more significant in light of the tenuous balance of interests that plagues the security clearance 2 review process. On one
hand, these decisions are vital to the nation's protection, as recent
high-profile security breaches have demonstrated.3 At stake is the very
safety of the nation's secrets-its intelligence sources, strategies,
strengths, and weaknesses. 4 On the other hand, security clearance decisions can have a profound effect on the livelihood of a significant
portion of the federal workforce, as more than 3.2 million government employees and contractors hold security clearances. 5 For example, many federal and defense contracting jobs are not accessible
without a security clearance. 6 Moreover, a loss of security clearance
may result in the termination of the employee. 7 Subsequently, the
individual may have difficulty finding comparable employment and
2

This Note only discusses U.S. national security clearances and does not address

state, private sector, or any other type of security clearance.
3 See, e.g., Evan Thomas, Inside the Mind of a Spy, NEWSWEEKJuly 7, 1997, at 34 (detailig the conviction of FBI agent Earl Pitts, who spied for the KBG for only $32,000 per year,
because "a $25,000 salary was too little to live on in New York City"); Tim Weiner, C.LA.
TraitorSeverely Hurt U.S. Security,Judge Is Told, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1997, at A24 (describing
how HaroldJ. Nicholson, "the highest-ranking C.I.A. official ever convicted of espionage,
unmasked 'a large number of C.I.A. officers' to his Russian handlers and destroyed important clandestine operations overseas"); Tim Weiner, Report Finds Ames's Sabotage More Vast
Than C.LA. Admitted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1994, at Al (reporting that Ames, a CIA agent
who spied for the Russians, exposed over 50 secret operations and suggesting that he
helped the Soviets catch and execute at least 10 double agents working for the CIA).
4 See infra Part I.
5 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFcE, GAO/NSIAD-95-101, BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS: IMPEDIMENTS TO CONSOLIDATING INVESTIGATIONS AND ADJUDIcATIVE FUNCrIoNs 12

(1995). Of those individuals, over 768,000 hold top secret clearances. See id.
6 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexulity,
and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American PublicLaw, 106 YALE LJ. 2411, 2426 (1997);
see also Katrina J. Church, Loss or Denial of Security Clearance: An Employee's Rights, 4 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HiGH TECH. LJ. 197, 198 (1988) ("The nature of defense contracting
is such that, without access to classified information, applicants at many levels cannot obtain work.").
7 See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
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may also suffer the stigma of being branded as a disloyal person by
society. 8
In certain situations, these security clearance decisions conflict
with the nation's interest in the enforcement of statutory and constitutional civil rights protections. 9 Because of the significance of national
security, courts treat security clearance decisions with great deference' ° and often refuse to review the merits" of those decisions on
the ground that such review would impermissibly intrude upon executive authority.12 When courts refuse to review the merits of security
clearance decisions, however, they insulate government agencies from
discrimination claims. 13 Employees who want to vindicate their constitutional and statutory rights to be free from discrimination may
14
have little or no recourse.
This conflict between the nation's security and the individual's
civil rights has led to an untenable compromise. When individuals
who have suffered adverse security clearance decisions 15 bring actions
under Title VII 1 6 alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color,
8

See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.

9 See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (involving termination based on employee's sexual preference); Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (involving
termination based on criminal record); Perez v. FBI, 71 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1995) (involving
alleged retaliatory termination for filing Title VII claim); Brazil v. United States Dep't of

Navy, 66 F.3d 193 (9th Cir. 1995) (involving termination allegedly based on race). For a
discussion of each case and these conflicts, see infra Part II.
10 See, e.g., Egan, 484 U.S. at 529-30 (reasoning that the "agency head... must bear
responsibility for the protection of classified information... [and] should have the final
say in deciding whether to repose his trust in an employee" (citing Cole v. Young, 351 U.S.
536, 546 (1956) (internal quotation marks omitted))); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 710 (1974) ("As to these areas of Art. II duties the courts have traditionally shown the
utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities."); see also Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress,
the Courts, and National Security Information, 103 HARv. L. REv. 906, 906 (1990) ("[T]he
judiciary ... ha[s] declined to challenge either the breadth or the scope of executive
classification decisions.").
11 A review of the merits in this context means that the adjudicating body will first
consider all available evidence that the government used to make a security clearance determination and will subsequently review the reasonableness of the government's action
based on that evidence. This Note also refers to this type of review as "substantive review"
or "de novo review."
12 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 530; Perez, 71 F.3d at 514-15; Brazil 66 F.3d at 196; Guillot v.
Garrett, 970 F.2d 1320, 1324 (4th Cir. 1992); Hill v. Department of Air Force, 844 F.2d
1407, 1410 (10th Cir. 1988); see also infra Part lI.B (describing the firm establishment of
deference to the Executive's national security decisions).
13 Some members of the Supreme Court, led by Justice Scalia, find the absence of
substantive review in security clearance cases unobjectionable. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 614
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "Congress can prescribe, at least within broad limits,
that for certain jobs the dismissal decision will be unreviewable").
14 See infra Part I.B.
15 The scope of this Note includes federal employees and the employees of government contractors.
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1994 & Supp. II 1997).
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religion, sex, or national origin, 17 courts consistently refuse to assert
jurisdiction.' 8 However, when individuals with claims falling outside
17

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of"race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin." Id § 2000e-2(a). Congress extended the protection of Tile VII to
federal employees by adding section 717 to Title VII in 1972. See id. § 2000e-16. Individuals belong to a "protected class" under Title VII for the purposes of this Note if they have
suffered discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
A protected class is not the same as the common constitutional law term "suspect
class." See Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact
Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REv. 267, 310
(1995). The distinction involves one of breadth; a protected class under Title VII includes
more categories than a suspect class. See id. Courts define a suspect class as a group with "a
history of having been subjected to purposeful, unjustified discrimination, and a history of
political powerlessness." Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications:On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEmp. L. REv. 937, 938 (1991). Whether a plaintiff is a
member of a suspect or quasi-suspect class determines which level of scrutiny a court will
apply-strict, intermediate, or a rational relationship test. SeeJoHN E. NowAK & RONALD
D. ROTuNDA, CONsTrrtrrONAL LAW § 14.3, at 601-06 (5th ed. 1995). To qualify as a suspect

class, the group (1) "must be discrete and insular," (2) "must have a 'disability' over which
[it does] not have control," (3) must have endured a history of intentional discrimination
or suffered disparate treatment because of an erroneous stereotype, and (4) must be subject to stigmatization by society. Strasser, supra, at 938-39 (internal quotation marks omitted). Suspect classifications include those "based on race, nationality, and alienage." Id. at
939.
A court will apply strict scrutiny to any law that discriminates against a suspect class
and hold that law as violating equal protection, unless the government can (1) justify the
discrimination with a compelling government interest and (2) prove that the law is narrowly tailored to promote that compelling interest. See NowAK & RoTuNDA, supra, § 14.3,
at 601-02. A quasi-suspect class differs from a suspect class in that a quasi-suspect class has
suffered "less severe" discrimination. Strasser, supra, at 938 n.5. If a group falls under a
quasi-suspect class category, a court will employ an intermediate scrutiny test and will not
uphold the discriminatory law, unless it bears a "rational relation to a legitimate state purpose." Id. at 939. The Supreme Court considers gender and illegitimacy classifications to
be quasi-suspect. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra, § 14.3, at 602.
If a classification is neither suspect nor quasi-suspect, a court employs a rational relationship test, whereby the discrimination must bear a rational relationship to a government interest that the Constitution does not prohibit. See id. at 601. The Supreme Court
has regarded sexual orientation classifications as non-suspect since Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986). See Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientation:Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classfication, 98 HA~v. L. Rzv. 1285 (1985) (arguing that the Court should classify
gays and lesbians as a suspect class).
18 See, e.g., Ryan v. Reno, 168 F.3d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Becerrav. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145
(4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision); Bodkin v. West, 91 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision); Perez v. FBI, 71 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1995); Brazil v. United
States Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 193 (9th Cir. 1995); Edwards v. Widnall, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1038
(D. Minn. 1998); Phillips v. Dalton, No. 94-CV-4828, 1997 WL 24846 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22,
1997); see also infraPart II.B (discussing judicial deference to national security decisions of
the Executive).
Individuals suffer a similar fate when they bring claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994), see, e.g., McDaniel v. AlliedSignal,
Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1482, 1490 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (holding that the ADA's reasonable accommodation standard does not require a government contractor to assure freedom from discrimination by the federal government's security clearance decisions because, under
Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S 518 (1988), "an agency's decision to grant, deny, or
revoke a security clearance is not open to further review"), and under section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1994). See, e.g., Humm v. Crow-
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of Title VII's coverage' 9 challenge security clearance decisions on constitutional grounds, 20 courts typically exercise judicial review of the
merits of an adverse security clearance decision. 21 The result is both
anomalous and counterintuitive. As the foregoing hypothetical illustrates, if two plaintiffs bring identical claims for discrimination, one
couching the complaint in the language of Title VII and the other in
terms of an equal protection claim, as was used in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FederalBureau ofNarcotics,22 courts will refuse
to review the Title VII claim, but will review the equal protection
claim. In addition, courts preclude plaintiffs who could bring a Title
ell, No. 97-5988, 1998 WL 869981, at *5 (6th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim of discrimination in the revocation of security clearance was unreviewable,
because such a decision is an "inherently discretionary decision which is committed to the
executive agency having the necessary expertise in protecting classified information");
Guillot v. Garrett, 970 F.2d 1320, 1325 (4th Cir. 1992) ("We can discem... no... expression of congressional intent in the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act... that the Executive's security clearance decisions be reviewable by the . . . federal courts on appeal.");
Lovelace v. Stone, 814 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Ky. 1992) (applying Supreme Court precedent
that holds that the Judiciary cannot review an Executive Branch decision to deny review to
a Rehabilitation Act claim); see also Keith Alan Byers, No One Is Above the Law When It Comes
to the ADA and the RehabilitationAct-Not Even Federal State, orLocal Law Enforcement Agencies,
30 Loy. LA L. REv. 977, 1022-23 (1997) (arguing that courts that prohibit review of Rehabilitation Act claims involving security clearance decisions "potentially provide[ ] federal
law enforcement agencies with an effective and powerful means to eliminate any applicant
an
or employee, even if unjustifiably motivated by the individual's disability status[,] ....
arbitrary blanket exclusion, an unjustified stereotype, or what otherwise would constitute
illegal disability discrimination"). Presumably, courts would also deny substantive review of
claims brought by individuals under section 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1994), but my research did not find any ADEA claims in the
security clearance context.
19 Tide VII does not protect individuals discriminated against on the basis of sexual
orientation. Because this is the only group that has been able to challenge its security
clearance revocations without recourse to a statutory claim, the only group unprotected
from discrimination that this Note will focus on is gays and lesbians.
20 Claimants may bring actions against federal officials for damages implied under
the Constitution (hereinafter "Bivens claims") on the basis of the Supreme Court's holding
in Bivens v. Six Unknown NamedAgents ofFederalBureau of Narcotics,403 U.S. 388 (1971). For
a discussion about this type of claim, see infra Part II.C.
21 See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,57074 (9th Cir. 1990) (reviewing the merits of defense contractor employees' class-action
equal protection claim regarding their security revocation); Dubbs v. CIA, 866 F.2d 1114
(9th Cir. 1989) (reversing summary judgment for CIA where plaintiff alleged that the CIA
had a blanket policy that denied security clearances to homosexuals); McKeand v. Laird,
490 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding revocation of security clearance based on
sexual preference "supported by substantial evidence" after review of the merits); Buttino
v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (performing substantive review to deny in
part defendant's motion for summary judgment where plaintiff alleged that FBI revoked
security clearance on the basis of sexual preference); see also infra Part lI.C (exploring the
constitutional basis for discrimination claims); cf. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v.
Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (reviewing labor union's claim that court should
enjoin Defense Department from using clearance questionnaires).
22 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For a discussion of the Bivens decision, see infra Part II.C.1.
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VII claim from asserting Bivens claims. 23 Therefore, individuals who
have been discriminated against based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin lack any legal recourse when that discrimination
comes in the form of a security clearance revocation. Consequently,
gays and lesbians currently are the only minority group that receives
substantive judicial review of their discrimination claims after adverse
security clearance decisions.
Thus far, courts have offered no real alternative to the stark
choice between allowing unfettered review of all constitutional claims
and prohibiting any review of statutory claims. The distinction between constitutional and statutory claims remains undeveloped, and
those courts that do question this distinction press for more, rather
than less, Executive Branch discretion.2 4 Moreover, the scholarship
addressing judicial review of security clearance decisions has inexplicably overlooked the anomalous treatment of Title VII protected-class
plaintiffs as compared to gays and lesbians who are able to receive
25
judicial review.
This Note proposes an Amendment to Title VII to remedy this
anomaly and to provide for review of the merits of discrimination
claims in the national security clearance context.2 6 Part I of this Note
offers an overview of national security clearances, including the history of security clearance formulation and the process behind clearance decisions. Part II explains the three forms of review available to
individuals who believe that the government has discriminated against
them. The first section in Part II explains internal review procedures.
The second section of Part II explains how judicial review of those
procedures laid the groundwork for the preclusion of Title VII claims
in security clearance decisions. The third section of Part II considers
the Supreme Court's willingness to review the merits of discrimination
claims implied directly from the Constitution. The fourth section of
Part II examines statutory preclusion of colorable constitutional
See Perez, 71 F.3d 513; Brazi4 66 F.3d 193.
24 See Hill v. Department of Air Force, 844 F.2d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir. 1988) (refusing
to allow plaintiff to circumvent "the statutory constraints imposed in Egan ....
simply by
23

invoking alleged constitutional rights"); Peterson v. Department of Navy, 687 F. Supp. 713,
715 (D.N.H. 1988) (same).
25 I would like to thank Joseph M. Terry for bringing to my attention and explaining
this problematic situation, which forms the basis of this Note.
26 As provided supra note 18, other employment discrimination statutes, such as the
Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and the ADEA, suffer from the same defects as Title VII.
While this Note may refer to cases that concern other statutory claims to support its thesis,
however, this Note's scope focuses only on remedying Title VII and leaves the reparation of
other statutes for another day. Hopefully this work will provide an adequate stepping
stone for further amendments to other federal employment discrimination statutes. Interestingly, my research has not detected any instance of this anomalous situation where a
claimant brought a Bivens claim with any other statute other than Title VII. Presumably,
however, claimants in those situations would suffer the same fate as Title VII plaintiffs.
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claims and then focuses on the anomaly that Title VII's preclusion of
Bivens constitutional claims presents in security clearance decisions.
Part III proposes an amendment to Title VII to remedy this distinction
and discusses potential challenges to this legislation.
I
NAT[ONAL SECURITY CLEARANCES IN A NUTSHELL

A.

History of Formulation

National security depends on the protection of sensitive data
27
from foreign powers and subversive elements on the homefront.
During a war, breaches in informational security can provide opponents with a decided advantage in military operations. 28 Moreover,
the need for military secrecy does not disappear during peacetime.
For example, technical information leaks during the post-World War
II arms race allowed the Soviets to close the gap on the development
of new weapons systems and decreased the United States' strategic
29
advantage.
Secrecy also serves an important role in the protection of our nation's intelligence operations. The United States depends on diplomatic and military intelligence to provide advance warning of
aggressive enemy moves, especially in an age when conventional
forces have great mobility and instant strike capacity.30 Compromising these intelligence operations might deprive the United States of
important information 3 l or lead to diplomatic embarrassment.3 2 In
particular, if allied nations doubt a government's ability to protect its
27
See David H. Topol, United States v. Morison: A Threat to the FirstAmendment Right to
Publish NationalSecurity Information, 43 S.C. L. REv. 581, 593-602 (1992) (recognizing need

for secrecy, yet arguing for more public disclosure of government information); see also
supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing CIA security leaks).
28 See Karl Tage Olson, Note, The Constitutionality of Department of Defense PressRestrictions on Wartime Correspondents Covering the Persian Gulf War, 41 DRAKE L. Ray. 511, 531-32
(1992). During the Gulf War, the military defended its press pooling arrangements as
essential for protecting journalists, U.S. troops, and operational security. See id. at 532.
29 See LANSING LAiONT, DAY OF TRIN=rr 282 (1965). Lamont suggests that Klaus
Fuchs's leak of information about the American's atom bomb accelerated Soviet development of a bomb "by as much as eighteen months to three years." Id.
30
See Topol, supra note 27, at 593-95.
31 See id. at 594 (noting that if the Japanese had discovered that the United States
broke Japanese codes, the Allies might have lost a significant advantage); id. at 595 (discussing how a Los Angeles Times story about a CIA mission to salvage a sunken Soviet submarine allowed the Soviets to thwart the mission).
32
See N.Y. TimEs, May 18, 1960, at I (headline reporting that Premier Khrushchev
canceled a summit with President Eisenhower because of the United States' failure to apologize for American espionage).
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own confidential material, they might become reluctant to share sensi33
tive information.
Even in the absence of the threat of war, secrecy is essential for
the promotion of national security. In this post-Cold War era, the U.S.
Government has shifted its attention to international terrorism. 34 In
this climate, secrecy enables the government to disrupt terrorist activity35 and to prevent weapons from falling into the wrong hands. 36
The post-Cold War era has also ushered in the rise of economic espionage.3 7 As the threat of war continues to decline, nations have fo-

cused on strengthening their economic positions in the world.3 8 To
that end, countries have increasingly developed methods to steal U.S.
technology.3 9
The need for secrecy prompted the United States to implement a
system to ensure that the nation's own employees do not leak confi40
dential information that mightjeopardize the security of the nation.
Contemporary national security clearances evolved from the document classification system which the Executive Branch created during
the early part of the twentieth century to protect sensitive informa33

See Secretary Rogers' News Conference ofJuly 1: The Duty of the Executive Branch

to Protect the National Security, DEP'T ST. BULL., July 5, 1971, at 78, 79-80 (reporting that
Secretary Rogers stated that several nations doubted the U.S. Government's ability to protect confidential information in the wake of the Pentagon Papers leak to the New York
Times).
34 See Dante B. Fascell, CombattingInternationalTerrorism: The Role of Congress, 16 GA. J.
INT'L & Com'. L. 655, 655-57 (1986) (noting that the U.S. considers international terrorism a top priority); W. Michael Reisman, Covert Action, 20 YALEJ. INT'L L. 419, 421 (1995)
("'[G]lobal issues' like international terrorism... have moved to the fore.").
35
See Reisman, supra note 34, at 424 ("One way, if not the only way, to prevent terrorist incidents is by covert counter-action.").
36 See Robert Chesney, NationalInsecurity: Nuclear MaterialAvailability and the Threat of
Nuclear Terrorism,20 Loy. LA INT'L & Comp. LJ. 29, 30-33 (1997) (warning of the threat of
nuclear terrorism in light of the "disintegration of the Soviet Union" into countries with
"unsecured and unaccounted-for" nuclear materials and "the potential existence of a black
market in fissile material, which is the one component in nuclear weapons that is hard to
find"). The CIA considers successful monitoring of the former Soviet states by American
operatives a high priority, but the agency has only recently begun to develop intelligence
to monitor the nuclear fission material security in those areas. See id. at 60. Congress
codified the means to protect nuclear energy and weapons technology when it passed the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 10, 60 Stat. 766 (1946) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2161-2163, 2165 (1994)).
37
See Karen Sepura, Note, Economic Espionage: The Front Line of a New World Economic
War, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 127, 127 (1998) (arguing that "economic competition," rather than "military alliances," now defines a nation's national security policy); Darren S. Tucker, Comment, The Federal Government's War on Economic Espionage, 18 U. PA. J.
INT'L EcoN. L. 1109, 1109-10 (1997) (attributing the rise of economic espionage to intelligence services' desire "to adopt new roles" in the face of post-Cold War budget cuts).
38 See Sepura, supra note 37, at 127-28; Tucker, supra note 37, at 1110.
39 See Tucker, supra note 37, at 1110.
40
SeeDepartment of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1988) (describing the Executive Branch's creation of a classification system to promote national security).
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tion.4 1 The outbreak of World War I prompted Congress to pass the
Espionage Act of 1917,42 which outlined the description of and punishment for spying. 43 Meanwhile, the General Headquarters of the
American Expeditionary Force created the first formal document classification system by requiring officials to mark all military information
"Secret," "Confidential," or "For Official Circulation Only."44 Later,
the advent of the Cold War motivated Congress to pass the Atomic
Energy Act of 194645 in an effort to protect nuclear energy and weapons technology.

46

In 1951, President Truman extended the military's formal classification system to civilian departments and federal agencies for the first
time. 47 Since Truman's order, a number of subsequent Presidents
have issued Executive Orders that delegate the classification of sensitive material to the heads of agencies. 48 Each of these orders envisioned a system similar to the one in place today, whereby agency
heads have the responsibility of classifying documents as "Top Secret,"
49
"Secret," or "Confidential."
Pursuant to these classified document designations, the Executive
Branch created a uniform security clearance program that regulates
which employees can gain access to sensitive information.5 0 Under
the security clearance program, government departments and agen41

See id.; FOREIGN AFFAIRS

92D CONG.,

lsr

Div.,

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,

SESS., SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AS A PROBLEM IN THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE

IN FOREIGN POLICY 3 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter SECURT CLASSIFICATIONi
The history preceding this relatively recent development, however, proves that the
United States has conducted certain military and diplomatic affairs under a veil of secrecy
since the nation's inception. See id. at 2. In 1790, President Washington laid the groundwork for a treaty with the Creek Indian Nation by submitting a secret article to the Senate.
See id. By the early nineteenth century, federal officials began marking documents that
they wanted to withhold from the public with the words "Secret," "Confidential," or "Private." See id.at 3. During the Civil War, the Union made an arrangement with the press to
disclose the details of military operations on the condition that the newspapers exclude
any information that could assist the Confederates. See FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 227-29 (Harold L. Nelson ed., 1967).
42
Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified as amended at 18

U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1994)).
43 See i&LThe Espionage Act replaced the nation's first criminal espionage law, which
Congress had passed in 1911. SeeAct of March 3, 1911, ch. 226, 36 Stat. 1084 (repealed
1917).
44 See SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, supra note 41, at 3.
45

Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 10, 60 Stat. 766 (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. §§ 2161-63, 2165 (1994)).
46
47

See id.
See Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R 789 (1949-1953); SECURITY CLASSIFICATION,

supra note 41, at 4.
48 See Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R 979 (1949-1953); Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3
C.F.R 678 (1971-1975); Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R 190 (1978); Exec. Order No.
12,356, § 4.1(a), 3 C.F.R. 174 (1982).
49 See Exec. Order No. 12,958, § 1.3, 3 C.F.R. 335-36 (1995).
50 See Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 1.2, 3 C.F.R. 392-93 (1995).
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cies classify jobs under three categories: critical sensitive, noncritical
sensitive, and nonsensitive.5 1 Thus, obtaining-and keeping-a security clearance is a prerequisite to holding many government jobs.
B.

Granting, Denying, Revoking, and Firing

Under the foregoing classification framework, agency officials
possess the discretionary power to grant, deny, or revoke security
clearance.5 2 The Supreme Court has held that no one has a constitutional or statutory right to a security clearance. 5 3 The relevant agency
determines all security clearance eligibility issues-grants, denials,
and revocations-under a "dearly consistent with the interests of national security" standard. 54 Before an agency will grant a security
clearance to an individual, it must conduct a background investigation, which varies "according to the degree of adverse effect" the applicant could have on national security. 55 Even after the government
grants a clearance, it periodically reinvestigates employees. These
reinvestigations of eligibility may lead to the revocation of an employee's security clearance. 5 6
A security clearance revocation does not always result merely in a
loss of status for a federal employee or a government contractor.5 7 In
fact, a clearance revocation commonly results in the employee's termination.5 8 Thus, discretionary revocation decisions actually constitute
termination decisions. The foundation for removals after security revocations began with Executive Order No. 10,450, 59 which authorized
agency heads to remove an employee after a security clearance revocation if the agency head deemed such termination "necessary or advisable in the interests of the national security." 60 Congress codified this
action in the removal procedures of the Civil Service Reform Act
(CSRA) of 1978.61 Sections 7512 and 7513 of the CSRA allow an
51
See Exec. Order No. 10,450, § 3(b), 3 C.F.R 937 (1949-1953).
52 See Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 3.1(b), 3 C.F.R. 397 (1995).
53 See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).
54 Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 3.1(d), 3 C.F.R. 397 (1995); see also Exec. Order No.
10,865, § 2, 3 C.FR. 399 (1959-1963) (same); Exec. Order No. 10,450, § 2, 3 C.FR. 936-37
(1949-1953) (same). Note that Executive Order 12,968 did not repeal Executive Orders
10,865 and 10,450, but merely restated some propositions and made additions to President
Eisenhower's orders. See Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 7.2(c), 3 C.F.R. 402 (1995).
55 Exec. Order No. 10,450, § 3(a), 3 C.F.R. 937 (1949-1953).
56 See Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 3.4(a)-(b), 3 C.F.R. 399 (1995).
57 See Church, supra note 6, at 198; Lieutenant Colonel Victor R Donovan, USAF,
Administrative andJudicialReview of Security ClearanceActions: Post Egan, 35 A.F. L. REv. 323,
327-28 (1991); Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85
R.1v. L. REv. 1130, 1183 (1972) [hereinafter Developments].
58 See Church, supra note 6, at 198.
59 Exec. Order No. 10,450, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 937-38 (1949-1953).
60 Id.
61
5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7513, 7532 (1994).
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agency to take adverse action, including removal, "only for such cause
as will promote the efficiency of the service." 62 Section 7532 mirrors
Executive Order 10,450 in that it authorizes the agency to remove an
employee when the agency head deems it "necessary in the interests
of national security.163 Yet agencies rarely use § 7532 to justify an employee's removal. 64 More commonly, agencies rely on the "efficiency"
provision of § 7513, arguing that employees who have lost their security clearances are not qualified to work. 65 Thus, the agency can argue
that removal promotes the efficiency of the service under § 7513.66
In addition to termination, two other serious consequences may
stem from a security clearance revocation. First, many employees who
lose both their clearance and job will often have difficulty finding
comparable employment. 67 Although a § 7513 removal does not automatically bar a person from all federal employment, once an agency
terminates an employee for security reasons, the government cannot
rehire that employee without approval from the department or
agency head and the Civil Service Commission. 68 In the context of
defense contracting, a revocation of clearance makes finding another
job in the same industry almost impossible. 69 Second, the security
70
clearance revocation may brand the employee a disloyal person.
7
Although the Supreme Court reasoned in Department of Navy v. Egan 1
72
that a loss of security clearance does not necessarily imply disloyalty,
it previously recognized that society might infer disloyalty from a revocation. 73 Thus, even if an agency does not interpret the label "security
risk" as a character judgment, "in the common understanding of the
public with whom [the employee] must hereafter live and work, the
term 'security risk' carries a much more sinister meaning."74 Given
the severe consequences that flow from security clearance revocations,
62
63
64

Id. § 7513(a).
Id. § 7532(a).
See Donovan, supra note 57, at 328.

65

See id

66 Se id
67 See Developments, supra note 57, at 1183.
68 See Executive Order No. 10,450, § 7,3 C.F.R. 938 (1949-53); Developments, supra
note 57, at 1183 n.290 (discussing procedure for rehiring).
69 See Church, supra note 6, at 198-99. Church argues that security clearance revocations destroy the careers of highly specialized defense contractor employees in Silicon Valley. See id. at 199.
70 See Developments, supra note 57, at 1183.
71 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
72 See id. at 528 (theorizing that a revocation could be "completely unrelated to
conduct").
73 See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952) (finding unconstitutional a
state statute that excluded certain employees from public employment "on disloyalty
grounds," asserting that such a "stain is a deep one" and "has become a badge of infamy").
74 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 901-02
(1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the availability of review of clearance determinations constitutes a
high priority for government employees.
II
REVIEW OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIms IN NATIONAL SECURrIY
CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS

A.

75

Internal Review

Before an agency denies or revokes a security clearance, due pro76
cess entitles an applicant or employee to review within the agency.
Under President Eisenhower's Executive Order 10,865,77 an employee's 7 8 due process rights included the following: the right to a
written statement of the reasons supporting the denial or revocation,
the right to a reasonable time to respond in writing and appear personally before the department head, and the right to written notice of
79
the final decision in the case.
In 1995, President Clinton extended these rights to include the
right to appeal the denial or revocation "to a high level panel."8 0 This
panel, which the agency head selects, must be composed of at least
three individuals, two of whom come from outside "the security
field."8 1 However, this additional process may represent a pyrrhic victory for employees, because Clinton's order allows the agency head to
make a final decision upon hearing the recommendations of the
82
panel.
An employee may be entitled to judicial review if the security
clearance revocation results in termination. 83 When an agency
removes an employee for cause under § 7513, the agency must provide the employee with the following: advance written notice of the
reasons for dismissal, a reasonable time to respond, attorney represen75 This Note considers discrimination only in the context of Title VII and Bivens equal
protection claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
76 See Exec. Order No. 12,968, § 5.2(a), 3 C.F.R. 399-400 (1995); Exec. Order No.
10,865, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 399 (1959-1963).
77 3 C.F.R. 398 (1959-1963).
78 The order expressly included within its coverage employees of the U.S. industries
that contract with federal agencies. See Exec. Order No. 10,865, § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 398-99
(1959-1963); see Church, supra note 6, at 201.
79 See Exec. Order No. 10,865, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 399 (1959-1963). In addition to the foregoing rights, the order also provides for an opportunity to be represented by counsel, and
an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and officials. See id.
80 Exec. Order No. 12,968 § 5.2(a) (6), 3 C.F.R. 400 (1995).
81 Id. President Clinton's order also provides for the right of the employee to receive
any documents, records, or reports on which the government based its decision. See id.
§ 5.2(a)(2), 3 C.F.R. 399.
82 See id. § 5.2(b), 3 C.F.R 400.
83 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7702, 7703(a) (1), 7513(b), 7532(c) (1994).
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tation, and a written statement of the final decision.8 4 Employees may
then appeal their removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB).85 In addition, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7702 and 7703 provide forjudicial
review of any claim of discrimination appealed to the MSPB under

§ 7512.86
When an agency terminates an employee for national security
reasons under § 7532, the pre-removal process requirements are similar, except that § 7532 requires an internal hearing.8 7 However, the
decision of the agency head is final under § 7532; employees have no
right to MSPB or judicial review. 8 Thus, § 7513 offers the only route
within the CSRA for employees to receive review outside the agency.8 9
Although the language of § 7512 seems to limit judicial review to the
agency's termination decision, 90 courts must also review the underlying revocation if that revocation constitutes the cause for removal. 9 '
In this context, the Supreme Court's determination of the permissible
scope of review of clearance revocations would lay the foundation for
all future statutory discrimination claims involving security clearance
92
revocations and denials.
B.

Title VII Claims
1.

The Political Question Doctrine,Executive Privilege, and
Separation of Powers

Judicial deference to executive national security decisions springs
from three interconnected principles: the political question doctrine,
84 See id. § 7513(b).
85 See id. § 7513(d). The MSPB is a product of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
(CSRA). See 5 U.S.C. § 7701. Prior to the CSRA, the Civil Service Commission conducted
reviews of adverse determinations. See Donovan, supra note 57, at 327. The CSRA split the
Civil Service Commission into separate branches for management and adjudication (the
MSPB) to promote efficiency and fairness. See id. This Note discusses the MSPB's review of
adverse actions under § 7513 in more detail below. See infra note 107 and accompanying
text.
86 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7702, 7703. Section 7702 provides for judicial review of MSPB decisions on claims of discrimination. See id. § 7702. Section 7703 allows judicial review of any
other MSPB determination. See id. § 7703.
87 See id. § 7 532(c).
88 See id.
89 See id. §§ 7513(b), 7702.
90 Section 7512 only allows review of a list of "adverse actions" that does not include
security clearance revocations and denials. Id. § 7512(A). Specifically, § 7512 provides
that review procedures under § 7513 apply only to: "(1) a removal; (2) a suspension for
more than 14 days; (3) a reduction in grade; (4) a reduction in pay; and (5) a furlough of
30 days or less." Id.
91
See Donovan, supranote 57, at 328 (noting that the MSPB reviewed the merits of
revocations for a brief time).
92 See generally Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (holding that the
MSPB did not have authority to review the merits of a decision to deny or revoke a security
clearance).
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executive privilege, and separation of powers. 93 Discrimination claims
within the security clearance context must always negotiate the obstacles that these three doctrines present. 94 Under the political question
doctrine, federal courts decline to adjudicate cases that are better
suited for resolution by the elected branches. 95 Courts deem such
cases nonjusticiable, rendering government action immune from judicial review. 96 If courts adjudicated these cases, constitutional concerns would arise "regarding separation of powers, institutional
competence, or the maintenance of the judiciary's authority."9 7 In

1962, Justice Brennan synthesized the modern political question doctrine in the landmark case of Baker v. Carr.98 The Baker Court asserted
that six analytical strands comprised the political question doctrine
and that each strand originated from separation of powers principles:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
99
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Under the executive privilege doctrine, courts have no jurisdiction to control the Executive's "performance of [its] official duties."1 0 0
93 This section focuses on only those aspects of these principles that courts use to
deny Title VII claimants review of the merits of security clearance decisions. Part III, infra,
offers a contrary interpretation of these principles.
94 See, e.g., Egan, 484 U.S. at 529-30.
95 See NoWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, § 2.15(a), at 106. The political question
doctrine stems from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), which simultaneously granted and limited the Court's power to decide questions of law for all three
branches of government
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court.
Id. at 170.
96 See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, § 2.15(a), at 106.
97 Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 931 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996).
98 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
99 Id. at 217.
100 NowAK & ROTUNDA, supranote 17, § 7.1 (a), at 235 (quoting Mississippi v.Johnson,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1866)). Some scholars argue in favor of a broad interpretation
of the doctrine of executive privilege, asserting that the President is immune from judicial
review when performing his constitutional duties. See, e.g., CHARLES K. BuRIcK, THE LAW
OF THE AmERicAN CONSnTTION § 50, at 125-27 (1922) (noting that the Executive cannot
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In the context of national security, support for this notion exists in the
Constitution's grant of broad discretion to the Executive to conduct
foreign affairs.' 0 '

Loaded with this constitutional ammunition, the

Supreme Court has repeatedly granted deference to claims of executive privilege concerning military, diplomatic, or national security
02
matters.
Given this broad notion of executive discretion in matters of national security, one could argue that any attempt to require the judiciary to review the merits of a clearance decision violates the separation
of powers principle. 10 According to this doctrine, "one branch is not
permitted to encroach on the domain or exercise the powers of another branch."'0 4 To determine whether a breach of the separation
be compelled to exercise its discretion in a particular way);
LOUGHBY, THE CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

3 WESTEL WOODBURY

W1t-

§§ 979-80, at 1497-1500 (2d ed.

1929) (arguing that the President is not "subject to compulsoryjudicial process" regarding
"the performance of a purely ministerial act").
101 For example, the Constitution provides that (1) "the executive Power shall be
vested in [the] President," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, and (2) "[the President shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," id. This constitutional
evidence also supports Justice Brennan's first category of the political question doctrine,
whereby courts shall not adjudicate claims when "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department" exists. Baker, 869 U.S. at
217.
102
See, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1985) (allowing CIA to avoid Freedom
of Information Act request); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 224 (1984) (reversing grant of
preliminary injunction which would have prevented enforcement of Cuban travel restrictions); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981) ("[F]oreign policy [is within] the province and responsibility of the Executive."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710
(1974) (noting that executive privilege may be asserted only to safeguard "military or diplomatic secrets"); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (finding executive privilege not waived by Tort Claims Act); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("[C]ourts [cannot] sit in camerain order to be
taken into executive confidences."); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1875)
(noting that the President had authority "during the war, as commander-in-chief of the
armies of the United States, to employ secret agents to enter the rebel lines and obtain
information" relevant to the war effort); see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that executive power "has been
pressed to the very hilt since the advent of the nuclear missile age").
103
See Note, supra note 10, at 918.
104 BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (6th ed. 1990). In simple terms, the three branches
have three separatejobs: the Legislature legislates, the Execitive executes the laws, and the
Judiciary interprets the laws and adjudicates disputes arising from the laws. See U.S. CONSr.
arts. I-Ill; BLAcn's LAw DicTIoNARY, supra, at 1365; see also Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703 ("[E]ach
branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation
of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others.").
In New York Times, Justice Stewart's concurrence offers the most illuminating example
of this formalist view of the separation of powers doctrine:
If the Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power in
the conduct of foreign affairs and the maintenance of our national defense,
then under the Constitution the Executive must have the largely unshared
duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to
exercise that power successfully ... [I]t is the constitutional duty of the
Executive-as a matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of law
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of powers exists, the Supreme Court "focuses on the extent to which
[the act in question] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplish05
ing its constitutionally assigned functions."
2.

Department of Navy v. Egan
10 6
The Supreme Court's decision in Department of Navy v. Egan,
provides the precedential basis for the application of the foregoing
principles and subsequent judicial reluctance to review Tide VII
claims.' 0 7 In Egan, the Navy denied security clearance to a civilian
employee.' 0 8 The Federal Circuit found that the employee was entifled to substantive review.10 9 The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that
the MSPB lacked the statutory authority to review the merits of a national security clearance revocation. 1 10
Although the Egan Court never explicitly invoked the doctrines
of political question, executive privilege, and separation of powers, it
implicitly relied on them to bolster its argument."' Writing for the
majority, Justice Blackmun hinted at the executive privilege doctrine
by noting that the discretionary nature of security clearance decisions
requires that they be "committed by law to the appropriate agency of
the Executive Branch."1 12 Blackmun then alluded to the first strand
of the Baker political question test 13 and separation-of-powers principles 1 4 by asserting that the President has a constitutional mandate
as the courts know law-. . . to protect the confidentiality necessary to carry
out its [foreign affairs] responsibilities ....
New York Times, 403 U.S. at 728-29 (Stewart, J., concurring).
105 Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
106
484 U.S. 518 (1988).
107
Egan was not a Title VII case, but rather an appeal of a § 7513 removal to the
MSPB. See id. at 520. Prior to Egan, the MSPB reviewed the merits of security clearance
revocations when it decided claims brought under § 7513 removals. See Bogdanowicz v.
Department of Army, 16 M.S.P.R- 653 (1983) (reviewing merits of security clearance revocations under § 7513). Bogdanowicz was the first case in which the MSPB reviewed the
merits of a security clearance revocation, but the MSPB based its opinion in that case on
the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Hoska v. United States Dep't of Army, 677 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir.
1982). See Bogdanowicz, 16 M.S.P.R. at 656. In Hoska, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the Army's
evidence supporting a security revocation on appeal from the MSPB. See Hoska, 677 F.2d at
139.
108 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 520.
109 See Egan v. Department of Navy, 802 F.2d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484
U.S. 518 (1988) (noting that if Egan's case had involved highly sensitive information, the
government could have terminated him under § 7532).
110 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 534.
111 See id. at 527-30. In fact, since Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court has
dismissed only two cases based on the political question doctrine. See Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (denying review of Senate impeachment proceedings); Gilligan
v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding issues concerning military command and training
nonjusticiable).
112 Egan, 484 U.S. at 527.
113 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
114
See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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under his Article II powers to control access to national security information.' 1 5 According to the Court, the government possessed the
right and a compelling reason to withhold sensitive national security
information from unauthorized persons."16
The Egan Court also advanced an institutional competence argument.1 7 According to the Court, one cannot have a right that is completely dependent upon "an affirmative act of discretion."" 8
Blackmun concluded that, because the "[p]redictivejudgment" of determining who should have access to sensitive information is "an inexact science," these decisions are not suitable for review by an outside,
nonexpert body." 9
The Court would have reached a different conclusion if Congress
had specifically provided for review of the merits of clearance revocations and denials under § 7513.120 However, § 7702 of the CSRA only
sanctions judicial review to ensure that the agency provides § 7513
procedural protections. 121 Therefore, the Court held that the MSPB
may review only the questions of whether the agency had cause to
terminate, whether the agency in fact denied clearance, and whether
the agency could have transferred the employee to another position.'2 2 This holding would have a profound effect on statutory
claims of discrimination-even on claims extending beyond the
CSRA.
3.

FederalCourts and Title VII Post-Egan

Claimants who believe the government has unlawfully discriminated against them by revoking their federal security clearances are
not necessarily limited to the CSRA's review procedures. Tile VII of
115 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 527. Justice Blackmun cited the President's constitutional
authority as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. See id. Under this mandate,
Blackmun argued:
[The President's] authority to classify and control access to information
bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive Branch that will
give that person access to such information flows primarily from this consti-

tutional investment of power in the President and exists quite apart from
any explicit congressional grant.
Id.
116
117

See id.

See id, at 528-30.
118 Id. at 528.
119 Id. at 529 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120 See id. at 530 ("[UInless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and
national security affairs.").
121 See5 U.S.C. § 7702 (1994); see alsoEgan, 484 U.S. at 530-31 (noting that "[n]othing
in the Act... directs or empowers the Board to go further").
122 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 530.

2000]

NATIONAL SECURITY CLEARANCE DECISIONS

803

the Civil Rights Act of 1964123 may be another option for federal em-

ployees seeking redress.' 24 However, two factors limit the availability
and attractiveness of this option. First, Title VII only prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2 5 Thus, the statute limits the field of claimants who can sue to
these specified protected classes. Second, membership in a Title VII
protected class can preclude an employee from seeking other forms of
relief. The Supreme Court has held that Title VII is "an exclusive,
pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of fed126
eral employment discrimination."
While Egan's holding only addresses the MSPB's lack of statutory
authority to review security clearance decisions, federal courts have
stretched this logic to preclude judicial review of the merits of clearance decisions in Title VII claims.1 2 7 Like Egan, these courts have
found that the language of Title VII fails to provide for review of executive security clearance decisions. 128 In fact, one court has even inter123

42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Congress extended Title VII

protection to federal employees when it added section 17 to Title VII in 1972. See id.
§ 2000e-16.
124 After unsuccessful MSPB review, a claimant may file a charge of discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See id. § 2000e-5(b). The
claimant may not seek judicial review until the EEOC has made a final disposition of her
claim. See id. § 2000e-5(e). The EEOC must first seek voluntary compliance, but if such
efforts fail, the Commission may take no further action when the respondent is a government agency. See id. § 2000e-5(f) (1). However, the EEOC must refer the case to the Attorney General, who may bring a civil action on behalf of a claimant. See id. If the Attorney
General declines to act, the EEOC must notify the claimant of her right to sue, and the
claimant may then fie suit in the appropriate federal court. See id. § 2000e-16(c).
125 See id. § 2000e-2. The key provision of Title VII provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
126 Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 829 (1976) (grounding this conclusion in congressional intent as well as "the structure of the 1972 Amendment itself').
127 See, e.g, Ryan v. Reno, 168 F.3d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145
(4th Cir. 1996); Bodkin v. West, 91 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 1996); Perez v. FBI, 71 F.3d 513 (5th
Cir. 1995); Brazil v. United States Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 193 (9th Cir. 1995); Edwards v.
Widnall, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (D. Minn. 1998); Phillips v. Dalton, No. 94-CV-4828, 1997 WL
24846 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 1997). As demonstrated supra note 18, individuals suffer a similar
fate when they bring claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
128 See Becerra, 94 F.3d at 149 ("[T]here is no unmistakable expression of purpose by
Congress in Title VII to subject the decision of the Navy to revoke Becerra's security clearance to judicial scrutiny."); Brazi4 66 F.3d at 197 ("Neither the express language nor the
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preted section 703(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964129 to expressly
foreclose discrimination claims based on security clearance determinations.1 3 0 The Title VII cases also mirror Egan by uniformly grounding their logic in notions of institutional competence,' 3 ' separation of
powers, 3 2 and deference to the Executive on national security matters.' 3 3 Thus, no member of a class protected by and suing under
Tide VII can receive substantive review of security clearance revoca34
tions or denials in federal court.
C.

Constitutional Claims
1. Bivens Claims

Although Title VII fails to protect a significant number of claimants from discrimination, 3 5 unprotected individuals do not lack recourse. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau of
Narcotics'3 6 claimants may bring actions against federal officials for
legislative history of Title VII. .. 'confer[s] broad authority' on the federal courts to review
security clearance decisions." (quoting Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988))).
129 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g).
L30 See Ryan, 168 F.3d at 524 n.3 ("Our decision [to foreclose Title VII claims based on
security clearance decisions] is fortified by Title VII's express language exempting employment actions based on security clearance possession vel non."). The Fourth Circuit reached
the same conclusion when it dismissed a claim based on section 501 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1994). See Guillot v. Garrett, 970 F.2d 1320,
1325-26 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Congress may have even confronted the specific question of
whether there should be review of security clearance decisions under the authority of the
Civil Rights Act and concluded that such decisions should instead be committed solely to
the discretion of the responsible Executive branch departments and agencies.").
131 See Ryan, 168 F.3d at 523 ("[An outside nonexpert body [cannot reasonably] decide whether the agency should have been able to make the necessary affirmative prediction with confidence. Nor can such a body determine what constitutes an acceptable
margin of error in assessing the potential risk."); Bodkin v. West, No. 95-2853, 1996 WL
406249, at *1 (4th Cir.June 18, 1996) ("[N]on-expert bodies [like the Judiciary] are institutionally incompetent to second-guess the substantive judgment of whether to deny or
revoke a security clearance." (quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 529) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
132 See Perez, 71 F.3d at 515 (arguing that substantive review of a security clearance
decision would be "an impermissible intrusion by the Judicial Branch into the authority of
the Executive Branch over matters of national security"); Brazi4 66 F.3d at 196 ("'[The
Judiciary has] no more business reviewing the merits of a decision to grant or revoke a
security clearance than [did the MSPB in Egan].... The decision to grant or revoke a
security clearance is committed to the discretion of the President by law.'" (quoting
Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990))).
133 See Ryan, 168 F.3d at 523 ("[T]he protection of classified information must be committed to the broad discretion of the agency responsible, and this must include broad
discretion to determine who may have access to it." (quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 529) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Brazi4 66 F.3d at 196 ("At the core of Egan'sdeference to
the national security mission is the recognition that security clearance determinations are
'sensitive and inherently discretionary' exercises .... " (quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 527-28)).
134 See Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 932 (3d Cir. 1996).
135 See supra note 17.
136 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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damages implied under the Constitution. 13 7 In Bivens, the Court recognized a cause of action for damages under the Fourth Amendment.138 Subsequently, federal courts have expanded the Bivens
doctrine to allow claims for damages grounded in the violation of
other constitutional rights.'3 9 Then, in Davis v. Passman,'40 the
Supreme Court recognized a Bivens claim that alleged violations of the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.' 4 1 The Davis model provides the procedural framework
for non-Title VII claimants seeking redress for discrimination in clearance decisions.
2. Webster v. Doe and Its Progeny
In stark contrast to its treatment of Title VII claims, the Supreme
Court provided for review of constitutional claims relating to security
clearance decisions in Webster v. Doe.142 In Webster, a homosexual electronics technician for the CIA challenged the Agency's decision to
terminate him on the ground that his homosexuality "posed a threat
to security."'143 Doe argued that his termination (1) violated § 706 of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),144 "because it was, inter alia,
arbitrary and capricious," (2) violated his property, liberty, and privacy rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments,
and (3) violated his equal protection rights by discriminating against
him on the basis of his sexual preference. 145 The CIA had revoked his
clearance pursuant to section 102(c) of the National Security Act
(NSA),146 which provides that "the Director [of Central Intelligence]
may, in the Director's discretion, terminate... any.. . employee of
the [CIA] whenever the Director shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States." 14 7 In light of
this statute, the Supreme Court held that it lacked a "meaningful standard of review" against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion under the APA, 14 and it dismissed the statutory claim. 49
137

See id. at 397.

138

See id.

See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (upholding Eighth Amendment
claim); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (allowing First Amendment
claim); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975) (granting review of Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments claims).
140
442 U.S. 228 (1979).
141 See id. at 230.
142 486 U.S. 592, 601-05 (1988).
143 Id. at 594-95.
144 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
145 See Webster, 486 U.S. at 596.
146
See id. at 595.
147 National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403-4(g) (1994).
148 Webster, 486 U.S. at 600.
139

149

See id. at 601.
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However, the Court found Doe's constitutional claims justiciable,
because Congress had not expressly foreclosed judicial review of constitutional claims in the text of section 102(c). 15 0 The Court held the
government to this heightened standard "in part to avoid the 'serious
constitutional question' that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional
claim."' 5 1 Moreover, the court rejected the CIA's argument that judicial review would entail "extensive 'rummaging around' in the [CIA's]
affairs."' 5 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted
that courts routinely entertain Title VII claims attacking the CIA's hiring and promotion decisions, which involve similar discovery
processes.' 53 Most importantly, the Court seemed confident that a
lower court could balance the plaintiffs need for access to evidence
"against the extraordinary needs of the CIA for confidentiality and the
54
protection of its methods, sources, and mission."'
In the wake of Webster, courts routinely review the merits of adverse security clearance decisions if the plaintiffs present colorable
constitutional claims.' 5 5 These courts undertake this review in an effort to prevent executive agencies from abrogating constitutional
norms in the name of security.' 56 However, courts have yet to find
any constitutional violations in Webster-type cases. To date, only one
district court has allowed a Webster equal protection claim to withstand
summaryjudgment. 157 These suits fail because the only claimants excluded by Title VII who bring constitutional challenges to security
clearance decisions are individuals who believe they have been discriminated against on the basis of sexual preference. Because homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class,' 58 an
agency's policy regarding homosexuals needs to survive only a rational
relationship test. But this fact does not diminish the paradox that
courts provide substantive review to claimants deemed unworthy of
protection under Title VII and the Constitution, yet deny substantive
15o See id. at 603 ("[Where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.").
151 Id. (quoting Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681,
n.12 (1986)).
152

Id. at 604.

153 See id. The CIA conceded this point in its Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13-14. See
Brief for Respondent at 37-38, Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (No. 86-1294);
Turbeville v. Casey, 525 F. Supp. 1070 (D.D.C. 1981).
154 Webster, 486 U.S. at 604.
155 See supra note 21.
156 See, e.g., Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298, 301 (noting that the government cannot
use "revocation [as) a mere pretext for the implementation of a discriminatory policy").
157 See id. at 303 (denying in part a motion for summaryjudgment, where FBI failed to
show that it would have revoked the plaintiff's clearance "even if he were heterosexual").
158 See supra note 17.
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review to groups traditionally favored by Title VII and the
Constitution.
D.

Preclusion of Bivens Claims by Title VII
1. Statutory Preclusion of Bivens Claims in General

The paradoxical treatment of statutory and constitutional claims
stems from dicta in the Bivens decision. 159 Interpreting Bivens, courts
originally recognized two instances in which a constitutional claim is
unavailable. 160 First, Congress may preclude a plaintiff from asserting
a constitutional claim by expressly providing an alternative remedy
that it considers to be an "equally effective" substitute. 16 1 Second, a
court can use its discretion to preclude a Bivens claim if "special fac162
tors counselling hesitation" exist.
Under this two-pronged test, Title VII should not preclude a Bivens equal protection claim for two reasons. First, Congress failed to
expressly declare that Title VII serves as a substitute for recovery
under the Constitution. 163 Second, in the decade after Bivens, the
Supreme Court declined to treat a congressional remedial scheme as
a special factor counseling hesitation.'6 Shortly after Bivens, however,
the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. General Services Administration1 65 made a constitutional remedy unlikely in the Tide VII context.

In that decision, the Court held that Title VII "provides the exclusive
judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment."' 66 Relying exclusively on Brown, and excluding from their
analysis any mention of the two-part Bivens test, lower federal courts
uniformly hold that Title VII precludes claims of discrimination
brought under the Fifth Amendment. 16 7 As an additional roadblock
159
See Note, Bivens Doctrinein Flux: Statutory Preclusionof a Constitutional Cause ofAction,
101 HARv. L. Rnv. 1251, 1251 (1988) (discussing the Bivens dicta).
160

See id.

161

Id.

162
163
164

Id. (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980)).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
See Note, supra note 159, at 1251-52 (noting that the court did not seize upon the

.special factor" exception until 1983).
165

425 U.S. 820 (1976).

166

Id. at 835.

See, e.g., Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that Titie VII
preempts all other remedial statutes and the Constitution); Lawrence v. Staats, 665 F.2d
1256, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same); Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (asserting that the only remedy possibly available to claimant was under Title VII,
even though claimant also brought a claim under the Fifth Amendment, because "§ 717 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964... provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment" (quoting Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820,
835 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gissen v. Tackman, 537 F.2d 784, 786
(3d Cir. 1976) (finding that "Brown effectively precludes [plaintiff] from any judicial
relief").
167
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to constitutional claims, dicta in Davis v. Passman 68 have implied that
Title VII would preclude a Bivens remedy when covered federal employees "seek to redress the violation of rights [already] guaranteed by
169
the statute."
Moreover, Supreme Court decisions after Bivens have skewed the
original two-part analysis to such an extent that a constitutional claim
would probably fail under the new test anyway. In Bush v. Lucas,170
the Court displayed its growing distaste for constitutional claims when
it ruled that a claimant could not maintain a First Amendment action
because the available statutory remedies, though "less than complete,"' 7 1 constituted "special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation."' 17 2 The Court stressed that
(1) the remedial scheme did not need to satisfy the "alternative remedy" prong and (2) the statutory remedy did not need to be as effective as the Bivens remedy. 173 Thus, the Court's new spin on the special
factors prong has effectively swallowed the two-part preclusion rule.17 4
Five years after Bush, the Court made matters even worse for proponents of Bivens claims when it ruled that complete congressional
inaction could preclude constitutional claims in Schweiker v. Chilicky.175
Whereas in Bush the Court had deferred to a congressional scheme
that, while concededly not equally effective, 176 did offer substantial
relief, the Chilicky Court yielded to a congressional scheme that,
although complex, did not even purport to redress the constitutional
injuries claimed.177 Judicial deference grew so broad under this third
installment of the special factors test that the Court would defer to the
Legislature unless congressional inaction was "inadvertant."'7 8 Therefore, coupling the Supreme Court's Bivensjurisprudence with Brown's
decree that Title VII is an exclusive remedy effectively bans plaintiffs
from asserting Bivens claims to circumvent the deficiencies of Tide
VII's remedial structure.
442 U.S. 228 (1979).
Id. at 247 n.26. In Davis, the Supreme Court allowed a Bivens claim to proceed in a
case involving employment in a congressman's office, which is outside Tide VII's domain.
See id. at 245.
170 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
171 Id. at 373.
172
Id. at 378.
173 See Note, supra note 159, at 1252.
174 See Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and ConstitutionalDamages Claims, 75 VA. L.
168
169

REV. 1117, 1147 (1989).

175 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
176 See Bush, 462 U.S. at 372.
177 See Nichol, supra note 174, at 1148.
178 Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423; see also Nichol, supra note 174, at 1149 ("Chilicky, if not
Bush before it, converted the special factors exception to an expansive loophole.").
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Without Recourse: Simultaneous Title VII and Bivens Claims in
the Security Clearance Context

Courts do not deviate from the foregoing trend when claimants
bring Title VII and Bivens claims simultaneously in the security clearance context. 7 9 The two federal circuits that confronted this situation denied Bivens review because of Title VII's exclusivity.' 80 In
addition, these courts also refused to review the merits of the Title VII
claim on the authority of Egan.'8 ' Thus, while individuals who cannot
seek protection under Title VII may seek judicial review of a security
clearance revocation, members of protected classes who rely on Tide
18 2
VII may not.
In Brazil v. United States Department of Navy,'8 3 a civilian employee
of the Navy alleged that the Navy discriminated against him on the
basis of his race when it revoked his security clearance.' 8 4 In addition
to bringing a Title VII action, Brazil asserted that the clearance revocations denied him equal protection guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 8 5 The Ninth Circuit denied review of the Title VII claim on
the basis of Egan.'8 6 The court then ruled that Title VII provided the
sole remedy for a civilian employee of the military who alleges employment discrimination.' 8 7 The court also reiterated the Supreme
Court's rules of statutory preclusion of constitutional claims, as laid
out in Bush v. Lucas.'8 8 Reasoning that Title VII provided what Congress considered adequate remedial measures for constitutional violations, the Ninth Circuit held that "'Bivens actions should not be
179 See Perez v. FBI, 71 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1995); Brazil v. United States Dep't of Navy,
66 F.3d 193 (9th Cir. 1995).
180 See Perez, 71 F.3d at 515; Brazi 66 F.3d at 198. In Jamil v. Secretary, Dep't of Defens4
910 F.2d 1203 (4th Cir. 1990), the Fourth Circuit did not reach the plaintiff's equal protection claim, because "nothing in the record... indicate (d] improper motivation based on
national origin." Id. at 1209 (affirming lower court's grant of summaryjudgment). However, the court expressed doubt that it would have reviewed the security clearance decision
even if the plaintiff had provided such evidence: "[I]t is arguable that [the plaintiff] might
have a valid claim of denial of his constitutional rights to equal protection ....Whether,
however, review of such alleged denial.., is reachable by a court in the light of Egan
presents a difficult question .... " Id.
181 See Perez, 71 F.3d at 514; Brazi4 66 F.3d at 197.
182 Compare, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1990) (granting review of constitutional equal protection claim), with Perez, 71
F.3d at 513 (denying review of Tide VII retaliation claim); see also supra note 127 and accompanying text (citing these and other cases).
183 66 F.3d 193 (9th Cir. 1995).
184 See id. at 195.
185 See id. at 197.
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 See id. at 198; see also supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text (discussing Bush).
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implied."' 18 9 The Brazil court rationalized this anomalous result by
noting that such a striking exception to Title VII's coverage could not
possibly be "inadvertent."19 0
In Perez v. FBI,'9 l Fernando Mata, an FBI agent, alleged that the
FBI revoked his security clearance and terminated him in retaliation
for filing a Title VII claim. 19 2 Like Brazil, Mata asserted both Tide VII
and Bivens claims, 19 3 and the Fifth Circuit refused to review either
claim.' 9 4 The court denied review of Mata's Title VII claim because it
95
would have involved examining the merits of the FBI's decision.'
The court also rejected the Bivens claims, because Title VII provides
the exclusive remedy and cause of action for federal employees alleging discrimination.19 6 Thus, just as in Brazi Mata did not receive the
judicial review normally afforded to members of even non-protected
classes.
The Tenth Circuit is the only other court that has recognized this
anomaly, but it argues for less, not more, judicial review. 197 Based on
the theory that allowing constitutional claims to trump statutory remedies threatens to eviscerate executive discretion, this court would find
all claims that require a review of the merits of security clearance revo198
cations nonjusticiable.

189 Brazil 66 F.3d at 198 (quoting Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir.
1989)). The Court also stated: "So long as Congress' failure to provide . . . significant
relief[ ] has not been inadvertent, courts should defer to its judgment, because 'Congress
is the body charged with making the inevitable compromises required in the design of a
massive and complex . . . program.'" Id. (quoting same) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
190 Brazil 66 F.3d at 198.
191 71 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1995).
192 See id. at 514.
193 See id. at 515. Mata brought Bivens claims under both the First Amendment and the
Fifth Amendment. See id.
194

See id.

195

See id. at 514.

196

See id. at 515.

197 See Hill v. Department of Air Force, 844 F.2d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[I]f the
statutory constraints imposed in Egan can be bypassed simply by invoking alleged constitutional rights, it makes the authority of Egan hardly worth the effort.").
198 See id. In Hig the Tenth Circuit ruled that a claimant who challenged an adverse
security clearance determination could not assert Fifth Amendment claims under the due
process and equal protection clauses. See id. at 1413. Although the claimant did not argue
for any statutory rights, Egan is the sole benchmark for the court's reasoning. See id. at
1409-11. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit handed down the decision immediately after
Egan, but before Webster v. Doe 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
In his dissent in Webster, Justice Scalia considered this conflict. See Webster, 486 U.S. at
613 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia argued that "it is simply untenable that there must be a
judicial remedy for every constitutional violation." Id.
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III
REmEDYING THE ANOMALY: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
TITE VII
In his Webster v. Doe dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Court

should not allow Bivens claims, because constitutional rights are not
more important than statutory rights.1 99 Justice Scalia may have been
correct in equating constitutional and statutory rights. However, this
Note argues that courts should vindicate both rights instead of denying them. Unfortunately, a judicial solution is not likely for two reasons. First, the lower federal courts have uniformly barred Bivens
20 0
claims when the employee qualifies for Title VII protection.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly considered this issue, its
prior decisions in Bush v. Lucas,20 ' Schweiker v. Chilicky,20 2 Brown v. Gen2 0 4 suggest that Biveral Services Administration,203 and Davis v. Passman
ens claims are a dying breed-both generally and in the Title VII
205
context.
Second, the chances of the Supreme Court overruling Egan or its
Title VII progeny are remote. On the basis of the political question,
20 6
executive privilege, and separation of powers doctrinal triumvirate,
the current law recognizes that (1) the Executive has constitutional
See Webster, 486 U.S. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the principle that
199
.a constitutional right is by its nature so much more important to the claimant than a
statutory right that a statute which plainly excludes the latter should not be read to exclude
the former unless it says so... has never been announced... because its premise is not
true"). In Webster, the Court dismissed a statutory claim under the APA, but remanded for
constitutional claims arising from the claimant's security clearance revocation. See id. at
601, 605; see also supra notes 142-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Webster
decision).
200 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
201 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
202 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
203 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
204 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
205 See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. Susan Bandes argues that the judicial branch must enforce constitutional claims when congressional authorization does not
exist and even when a statutory scheme exists, but is inadequate. See Susan Bandes,
Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CA. L. REv. 289, 293-325 (1995).
According to Bandes, the Judiciary must provide Bivens claims to individuals in order to
fulfill its role in a functionalist separation-of-powers regime in which the three branches
share duties and serve as checks and balances to each other to avoid governmental tyranny.
See id&at 316. If the Supreme Court adheres to Bandes's advice, the anomaly that this Note
addresses might find an alternative solution to a proposed amendment to Title VII. Thus,
the Court could reverse its trend of increasing deference to congressional inaction and
begin to support Bandes's broader Bivens approach, which mandates that the Judiciary,
"whenever necessary, fashions adequate remedies for constitutional wrongs." Id. at 298.
However, this argument is beyond the scope of this Note, and Bandes has effectively provided a framework for the courts to employ should they choose not to allow Title VII to
preclude Bivens claims in security clearance determinations.
206 See supra Part II.B.1.
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authority and discretion to control the security clearance process, 20 7
and (2) the judiciary lacks the institutional competence to infringe
upon this discretion. 20 8 However, Egan left one door open for substantive review. 20 9 The Court acknowledged that if Congress had specifically provided for review of the merits of security clearance
2 10
decisions, the Judiciary would not defer to the Executive.
In light of the foregoing situation, Congress should take action to
protect the rights of employees who are currently handicapped by Tide VII coverage. Specifically, Congress should amend Title VII to provide for a review of the merits of security clearance determinations.
The proposed amendment would be most effective if Congress altered
subsections (c) and (e) of the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972211 to
read as follows (proposed additions in italics):
(c)

CIVIL ACTION BY EMPLOYEE OR APPLICANT FOR EMPLOYMENT FOR

REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES; TIME FOR BRINGING OF ACTION; HEAD OF DEPARTMENT, AGENCY, OR UNIT AS DEFENDANT

Within 90 days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a
department, agency, or unit referred to in subsection (a) of this
section, or by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
upon an appeal from a decision or order of such department,
agency, or unit on a complaint of discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin, brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, Executive Order 11478 or any succeeding
Executive orders, or after one hundred and eighty days from the
filing of the initial charge with the department, agency, or unit or
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on appeal

from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit until
such time as final action may be taken by a department, agency, or
unit, an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the
final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section
2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant. Any
court in which an employee files a complaint of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex or nationalorigin, brought pursuant to subsection
(a) of this section, shall have the authority to review the merits of such a
claim, includinga claim in which an employee files a complaint of discrimination arisingfrom the revocation or denial of that employee's national security clearance.

207
208

See supranotes 111-16, 118-19 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 117, 119 and accompanying text.
209 See supranotes 121-22 and accompanying text.
210 See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988); supra notes 121-22 and
accompanying text.
211
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), (e) (1994).
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(e) Government agency or official not relieved of responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment or equal employment opportunity
Nothing contained in this Act shall relieve any Government
agency or official of its or his primary responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment, includingnondiscriminationin the revocation and denial of national security clearances, as required by the
Constitution and statutes or of its or his responsibilities under Executive Order 11478 relating to equal employment opportunity in the
2 12
Federal Government.
Additionally, Congress should amend section 7 03(g) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964213 to silence critics who have argued that Congress
enacted section 7 03(g) to foreclose judicial review of security clearance decisions.2 14 Thus, an amendment to section 7 03(g) should
read as follows (proposed additions in italics):

(g) NATIONAL SECURrIY
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire and employ any individual for any position, for an
employer to discharge any individual from any position, or for an
employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, or for a labor organization to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, if(1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises
in or upon which any part of the duties of such position is performed or is to be performed, is subject to any requirement imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States
under any security program in effect pursuant to or administered
under any statute of the United States or any Executive order of the
President; and
(2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that
requirement. However, any court of competent jurisdiction in which an

employee files a complaint of discrimination regarding this determination,
pursuant to section 2000e-5 of this title, shall have the authority to review
Id. (proposed additions in italics).
213 Id. § 2000e-2(g).
214 See, e.g., Ryan v. Reno, 168 F.3d 520, 524 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Our decision [that a
discrimination claim based on an adverse security clearance decision is not actionable
under Title VII] is fortified by Title VII's express language exempting employment actions
based on security clearance possession vel non."); Guillot v. Garrett, 970 F.2d 1320, 1325
(4th Cir. 1992) ("Congress may have even confronted the specific question of whether
there should be review of security clearance decisions under the authority of the Civil
Rights Act and concluded that such decisions should instead be committed solely to the
discretion of the responsible Executive branch departments and agencies."); Pamela L.
Perry, BalancingEqualEmployment Opportunitieswith Emploers' Legitimate Discretion:The Business Necessity Response to DisparateImpact DiscriminationUnder Title VII, 12 INDus. REL.. L.J. 1,
41 n.193 (1990) ("Congress determined... that.., national security would outweigh
disparate impact discrimination .... .").
212
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the merits of such a claim, even if such review requires a determination as to
whether such individual has fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that
requirement.2 15
An amendment to section 7 03 (g) would not strip the government of
its authority to revoke a security clearance if an employee "has not
fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill" a "requirement imposed in the interest of national security." 2 16 Instead, the amendment would merely
provide a judicial check to ensure that the government grounds such
decisions on legitimate national security requirements.
To clarify these amendments, Congress should also define the
term "review of the merits." An addition to section 701 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 would provide a guideline for courts when they
review security clearance decisions. The addition should read as
follows:
(o) The term "review of the merits" means that the adjudicatingbody will
first consider all the available evidence that the employer used to make the
disputed decision and will subsequently review the reasonablenessof the employer's action based on that evidence.
These amendments would enable courts to review the merits of security clearance decisions affecting employees protected under Title VII.
A.

Challenges to Legislation

The viability of the amendment hinges upon overcoming several
obstacles. The first hurdle is to convince Congress that an amendment that could compel the Executive to disclose sensitive information is necessary. Opponents of a Title VII amendment might argue
that this would be difficult because section 7 03(g) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 arguably forecloses judicial review of security clearance
decisions. 2 17 Moreover, during the passage of the Equal Employment
Act of 1972, Congress explicitly stated that it did not intend to infringe upon executive discretion in decisions affecting national

security.

2 18

Even if Congress passes an amendment to Title VII, the revisions
would probably encounter other challenges from the President. First,
the President can exercise his veto power if he believes the legislation
would interfere with executive discretion in security clearance proce215

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g) (proposed additions in italics).

216

Id.

217
218

See supra note 214 and accompanying text.

See H.R. REP. No. 92-238 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.G.AN. 2137, 2185 ("In
providing the statutory basis for such appeal or court access, it is not the intent of the
Committee to subordinate any discretionary authority or final judgment now reposed in
agency heads by, or under, statute for national security reasons in the interests of the
United States.").
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dures. 219 Judging from the Executive Branch's previous reaction to
attempts to limit its discretion in national security matters, the veto
seems likely.220 However, Congress could override the veto if it gar2 21
nered a tvo-thirds vote.
The President can also exercise another check by challenging the
constitutionality of the amendment in court. 222 Constitutional objec-

tions to the legislation would proceed under the doctrine of separation of powers.2 2 3 Arguing that the discretion to control security
clearance decisions "must be committed to the broad discretion of the
agency responsible," 2 24 opponents could view mandatory judicial review of security clearance decisions as an encroachment upon the
President's privilege in the protection of national defense and inter225
national relations.
B.

Defending the Amendment

Despite these stiff challenges, this Note concludes that the doctrine of separation of powers provides Congress with the responsibility
and the authority to pass the foregoing amendment to Title VII. The
Supreme Court's inability to settle on a uniform approach to this doctrine, however, may have a profound effect on the amendment's
durability.
The history of separation-of-powers jurisprudence reflects a vacillation by the Supreme Court "between a formalist approach and a
functionalist approach." 2 26 The formalist approach, which provides
the firepower for opponents of the amendment, relies on "adherence
to a strict interpretation of the Constitution and the intent of the
219
220
221

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.

See supra notes 111-16, 118-19.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. On a related topic, Congress passed the 1974
Amendment to the Freedom of Information Act, which provided for judicial review of
information classification determinations. SeeJames A. Goldston et al., Comment, A Nation
Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 HAuv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv. 409, 477 &
n.343 (1986). President Ford vetoed the Amendment on the grounds that discretion was
necessary and substantive review was detrimental to national security. See id. Nevertheless,
Congress overrode the veto. See id. Nothing in the history of this de novo review since that
time suggests any detrimental effect on the Executive's power to promote national security.
222 SeeJohn Norton Moore, Do We Have an Imperial Congress, 43 U. MIAMI L. Rxv. 139,
152-53, 153 n.48 (1988).
223 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. The separation-of-powers doctrine
would encompass political question and executive privilege principles as well. See supra
notes 93-102.
224 Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988).
225 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-30 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
226 Michael L. Yoder, Note, SeparationofPowers: No Longer Simply Hangingin the Balance,
79 GEo. LJ. 173, 173 (1990). I would like to thank Stacey A. Miness for her expert guidance on this complicated history.
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framers" 227 by focusing on the constitutionally mandated separation
among the three branches of government. 228 Additionally, adherents

to this view believe that "power that is characterized as executive, legislative, or judicial must be consolidated exclusively within the corresponding branch of government, the only exceptions being the few
22 9
explicit checks provided for by the Constitution."
For example, Justice Stewart argued in favor of this "formalist"
view of the separation of powers in New York Times Co. v. United

States230 (The Pentagon Papers Case): "[U]nder the Constitution the
[E]xecutive must have the largely unshared duty to determine and
preserve the degree of internal security necessary to exercise that
power successfully." 23 1 Despite this argument for plenary national security discretion, Justice Stewart recognized the need to check such
unbridled power. 2 2 However, because his strictly compartmentalized
view of separation of powers left the judicial and legislative branches
out of this process, the only check that Justice Stewart could identify
23
was the public's ability to vote the President out of office.
But Justice Stewart only scratched at the surface of the true
framework for a legitimate separation-of-powers system which the
Founding Fathers contemplated at the nation's inception. To begin
with, Justice Stewart ignored the constitutional language which gives
Congress the authority to check executive action in national security
matters. 23 4 But most significantly, Justice Stewart overlooked the fact

that Congress had to serve as a check if the republic was to remain
227 Lisa A. Cahill & J. Russell Jackson, Note, Nondelegation After Mistretta: Phoenix or
Phathon?, 31 WM. & MARY,L. REv. 1047, 1051 (1990).
228 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Dangerof Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and
Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY,L. REv. 417, 417 n.4 (1997).
229 Yoder, supra note 226, at 173.
230 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
231
New York Times, 403 U.S. at 729 (StewartJ. concurring); see also NowAK & RoTUNDA,
supra note 17, § 16.17, at 1025-27 (summarizing the Justices' opinions on the separation of
powers doctrine in the Pentagon Papers Case).
232 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
233 See id. (Stewart, J., concurring) ("In the absence of the governmental checks and
balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in
... an informed and critical public opinion ....").
234 For example, the Constitution grants Congress the power, inter alia, to (1) "provide for the common Defence," U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1; (2) "declare War ...and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; (3) "make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," id.art. I, § 8, cl. 14; and (4)
'make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution," id. art I, § 8, cl. 18. Furthermore, the Constitution gives Congress the power of the purse, by declaring that "[n]o
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law." Id. art. I, § 9, c. 7.
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viable. 235 According to James Madison, the separation of powers principle did not stand for the proposition that the branches of government "ought to have no partialagency in, or no controul over the acts of
each other. '23 6 Rather, Madison took a functionalist approach, cautioning that "where the whole power of one department is exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of another department,
the fundamental principles of a free constitution [will be] subverted." 237 Drawing from this history, courts employing a functionalist
analysis "presuppose[ ] that the Framers' intent was to create a government in which the necessary segregation of powers would be accomplished through a system of checks and balances, rather than by
complete separation of the three branches." 23 8 The Supreme Court
has reiterated this functionalist approach in many separation of pow23 9
ers cases.
Despite the aforementioned vacillation by the Court between formalism and functionalism, the majority of the Justices have recently
appeared to favor functionalism in separation-of-powers cases. The
fact that "[e]very Supreme Court Justice except Justice Scalia agreed
with the functionalist approach in [Mistrettav. United States2 40 and Morrison v. Olson]"2 41 supports this assertion. 242 Moreover, the leading formalist cases have invalidated power-sharing arrangements between
Congress and the President, while the functionalist decisions have
235 See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961);
Jonathan L. Entin, Separation ofPowers, the PoliticalBranches, and the Limits ofJudicial Review,
51 OHio ST. L.J. 175, 179 (1990).
236 THE FEDERAusT No. 47, at 325 (James Madison).
237
Id. at 325-26.

Yoder, supranote 226, at 173.
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) ("[T]he greatest security against tyranny-the accumulation of excessive authority in a single Branch-lies not in
a hermetic division among the Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked and
balanced power within each Branch."); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425, 443 (1977) (rejecting as "archaic" complete isolation of the three branches); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curiam) (noting Madison's belief that the branches
have a duty of interdependence, a lack of which "would preclude the establishment of a
Nation capable of governing itself effectively"); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704
(1974) (adhering to Madison's flexible approach to the separation of powers); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[The
Constitution] enjoins upon its Branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity.").
240 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
241
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
242
Yoder, supra note 226, at 173 n.6. Although some scholars do not agree that Mistrettaand Morrisonrepresent an adoption of functionalism, see Cahill &Jackson, supra note
227, at 1048 n.7 (citing scholars who hold this view), most acknowledge that "functionalism
has been somewhat more prevalent than formalism in the Supreme Court's separation of
powers jurisprudence." Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theoy of the Second Bes 80 CORNELL L. Rrv. 1, 6-7
(1994). For a helpful categorization of many of the significant separation-of-powers decisions along functionalism/formalism lines, see McCutchen, supra, at 7 n.21.
238
239
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permitted the Judiciary to assume legislative and executive functions,
favoring the power transfer at issue here. 243 However, the Court has
sidestepped official endorsement of one school of thought over the
other and instead continues to rely on both approaches-sometimes
even in cases decided contemporaneously. 244 Consequently, the
Court might conceivably rely on either functionalist or formalist rhetoric to analyze a constitutional challenge to this Note's proposed
245
amendment.
If the Court uses a functionalist analysis, it will probably rely on
the framework set forth in Mistretta v. United States.2 46 The Mistretta
Court held that Congress cannot usurp power that properly belongs
to another branch. 247 In addition, the Court found that legislation
which creates a "potential for disruption" of another branch could be
struck down. 248 In such cases, courts must determine "whether that

impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within
the constitutional authority of Congress." 24 9
Under Mistretta, a court might strike down this Note's proposed
Title VII legislation. However, despite the Supreme Court's history of
protecting executive discretion-both generally2 50 and particularly in

result seems unlikely. 25 2
the national security context 2 1-this
Although Mistretta's disruption standard might provide ammunition
243
See Krotoszynski, supra note 228, at 480 (comparing the formalist decisions in Bowsherv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), and INSv. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), to the functionalist decisions in Morrison and Mistretta).
244 See McCutchen, supra note 242, at 6 n.20 (citing, among other cases, Metropolitan
WashingtonAirportsAuthority v. Citizensfor the Abatement of AircraftNoise 501 U.S. 252 (1991),
as an example of formalism and Freytag v. Commissioner of InternalRevenue, 501 U.S. 868
(1991), decided 10 days later, as an example of functionalism).
245 Incidentally, at least one scholar has espoused the view that "the functional approach offers the judge a purportedly realistic rhetoric with which to justify a decision
upholding a statute" and "the formal approach offers the judge a purportedly legalistic
rhetoric with which to justify a decision that strikes down the statute." Mark Tushnet, The
SentencingCommission and ConstitutionalTheory: Bowls and Plateausin Separationof Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 581, 581 (1992). This theory suggests that the fate of this Note's
amendment hinges upon the Justices' determination of whether or not they want the
amendment to take effect. Nonetheless, this Note contends that the amendment can survive scrutiny under either approach.
246 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
247
See id. at 382-83.
248 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383 n.13 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433
U.S. 425, 433 (1977)).

249

250

Id.

See supra note 102.
See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988); cf. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.
592 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" of national security issues to the Executive Branch may exist).
252 SeeYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 647 (1952) (JacksonJ,
concurring) ("[Although] [t]he claim of inherent and unrestricted presidential powers
has long been a persuasive dialectical weapon in political controversy[,] ... ajudge cannot
accept self-serving ... statements.., in answering a constitutional question .... ").
251
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for opponents of a Title VII amendment, the courts should consider
the importance of this amendment as "an overriding need to promote" Congress's constitutionally sanctioned objectives. Therefore,
the legislation should prevail under a functionalist approach.
Alternatively, the amendment may also survive analysis under a
formalist approach. As described above, formalism provides an exception to its strict power-within-each-branch mentality in the form of
checks among the branches of government specifically provided in
the Constitution.2 5 3 In the context of national security, Congress does
possess this requisite constitutional authority to check executive action. 2 54 Consequently, the proposed legislation still has a chance to

succeed under formalism's more exacting standard.
Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers under either approach requires Congress to serve as a check on executive discretion
in national security matters. Because the Legislative Branch bears the
responsibility of funding and maintaining the Executive's national security system, 2 5 5 it must have reassurance that the Executive is carrying out these affairs competently. Congress can achieve this result by
providing for judicial review of the merits of security clearance decisions. On the other hand, if claimants remain unable to receive substantive review under Title VII in these situations, Congress will be
unable to ensure that the Executive Branch is administering the nation's business legitimately and effectively. Moreover, the unamended
provisions as they now stand represent an inexcusable abdication of
responsibility on the part of Congress. Until Title VII furnishes a forum for claims of discrimination in the security clearance context,
thousands of federal employees will be subject to the whims of executive discretion, because the Legislature has lost sight of the statute's
2 56
overarching theme: freedom from discrimination in employment.
See supra text accompanying note 104.
See supra note 234.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, ci. 7.
In United StatesInfo. Agency v. KRC, 905 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1990), ChiefJudge Wald
of the D.C. Circuit recognized this dilemma after ruling that the APA did not provide for
substantive review of a security clearance determination:
I find highly disconcerting the notion that government agencies can terminate outstanding civil servants without any substantive review simply by invoking "national security." The possibility of unreviewable agency "security
officers" giving effect to homophobic or other biases is all too apparent.
Congress clearly has the authority to provide for substantive review of security clearance determinations, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,
530 (1988) ... I hope that this case will encourage it to consider such a
course.
Id. at 400 (separate statement). Judge Mikva agreed and asserted that
[n]o one can be comfortable with the process that has been afforded the
federal employee in this case, even though it may be all the process that is
due under the statute. I too hope that Congress will revisit the statutory
scheme and provide federal employees with a better plan.
253
254
255
256
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To quell the congressional and judicial discomfort that inevitably
will result from this amendment, the legislative history should emphasize that substantive judicial review does not need to trample the Executive Branch's important need for secrecy. As ChiefJustice Rehnquist
noted in Webster v. Doe,257 courts can easily control the discovery pro-

cess with in camera proceedings. 2 58 Thus, a judge can safely balance
the needs of the employee and the agency without risking security
breaches. 25 9 Under the foregoing discovery framework, there is no
reason to believe that a court could not determine whether a revoca2 60
tion or denial is merely a pretext for discrimination.
Because courts already conduct similar inquiries in other types of
discrimination cases, these determinations are unlikely to be beyond
the scope of their institutional competence. 2 6' Moreover, courts regularly review security clearance decisions when the plaintiff has asserted
Id. (separate statement).
Interestingly, even though the judges bemoaned the employee's lack of statutory protection from discrimination in this context, the D.C. Circuit remanded the claimant's
equal protection claim so that the district court could conduct a substantive review. See id.
257 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
258 See id. at 604. In contrast, the Court in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518
(1988), had argued that review of security clearance determinations was generally beyond
the ken of federal courts. See id. at 528-30; see also notes 111-19 and accompanying text
(discussing the Egan Court's decision).
259 See Webster, 484 U.S. at 604. The Chief Justice asserted that
the District Court has the latitude to control any discovery process which
may be instituted so as to balance [a claimant's] need for access to proof
which would support a colorable constitutional claim against the extraordinary needs of the CIA for confidentiality and the protection of its methods,
sources, and mission.
Id. (citing Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 405 (1976) and United States
v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)).
In Kerr, the Supreme Court sanctioned in camera review of state prison parole documents. See Kerr,426 U.S. at 405. The Court viewed in camera review as a "relatively costless
and eminently worthwhile method to ensure that the balance between petitioners' claims
of irrelevance and governmental privilege and plaintiffs' asserted need for the documents
... " Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
In Reynold, the Supreme Court allowed the government to assert privilege and avoid
producing military documents in a tort case. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2. The Court noted
that the government may prevail on a privilege claim without submitting documents for in
camera review:.
Yet we will not go so far as to say that the court may automatically require a
complete disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the
circumstances of the case, that there is reasonable danger that compulsion
of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When this is the case... the court
should notjeopardize the security ... by insisting upon examination of the
evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.
Id. at 9-10.
260 See Webster, 486 U.S. at 604.
26L See id. ("Tite VII claims attacking the hiring and promotion policies of the Agency
are routinely entertained.").
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a constitutional claim. 26 2 This inquiry would not require a court to

tackle the difficult questions that agencies face when they conduct
background investigations "to define not only the individual's future
actions, but those of outside and unknown influences." 26 3 Therefore,
it seems unlikely that review of statutory claims would force courts to
delve into terrain that is either unfamiliar or beyond the boundaries
of their institutional competence.
CONCLUSION

There is no acceptable rationale behind the disparate treatment
of constitutional and Title VII claims in national security clearance
decisions. To base distinctions on the empty recitation of words is to
place form above function, often with deleterious results. The inability of Fernando Mata and Ernest Brazil to vindicate their Title VII re2 64
taliation claims demonstrates the absurdity of this distinction.
Because courts have abdicated their power of review over the Executive in Title VII security clearance cases, the only remedy is to enlist
the aid of Congress. Thus, Congress must amend Title VII to provide
for review of the merits of security clearance claims. Without this legislative action, the Executive Branch's national security policies could
conceivably run rampant over individuals who have no forum for their
valid discrimination claims.

262 See, e.g., Dubbs v. CIA, 866 F.2d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing summary
judgment on plaintiffs constitutional claim when plaintiff alleged discrimination on the
basis of sexual preference).
263 Egan, 484 U.S. at 529.
264 See Perez v. FBI, 71 F.d 513, 515 (5th Cir. 1995); Brazil v. Navy, 66 F.3d 193 (9th
Cir. 1995).

